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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between changes in telecom-
munications provider concentration on international long distance routes
and changes in prices on those routes. Overall, decreased concentra-
tion is associated with significantly lower prices to consumers of long
distance services. However, the relationship between concentration
and price varies according to the type of long distance plan considered.
For the international flagship plans frequently selected by more price-
conscious consumers of international long distance, increased compe-
tition on a route is associated with lower prices. In contrast, for the
basic international plans that are the default selection for consumers,
increased competition on a route is actually associated with higher
prices. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, price dispersion appears to in-
crease as competition increases.
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1 Introduction
Little evidence exists about the relationship between long distance
competition and long distance rates, despite the extensive and ex-
tended pursuit of such competition by regulators. In the 1990s, rate
reductions in the US were dramatic while, at the same time, long
distance competition increased substantially. From this association,
casual empiricism might suggest that increased competition is asso-
ciated with lower rates. However, such a conclusion is far too facile
because the decade also witnessed a considerable decline in the costs
of providing long distance service. We cannot infer that the reductions
in the rates for long distance calls occurred as a result of increasing
competition; instead, the rates may have fallen simply because the
costs of providing service decreased. This paper seeks to better un-
derstand the relationship between long distance competition and long
distance rates.
The structure of the US long distance telecommunications market
has changed dramatically since MCI began providing switched long
distance service in 1974. Prior to that time, AT&T was the primary
provider of US long distance service. In the late 1970s, regulators en-
couraged competition in long distance service by prompting AT&T to
negotiate temporary access tariffs that allowed long distance carriers
to interconnect with its local facilities on standard terms. The funda-
mental rationale for policy makers to encourage competition has been
the belief that competition leads to lower prices. While this belief is
in accord with standard economic theory, and US long distance rates
have indeed fallen by as much as 80% since 1984, there is surprisingly
little evidence to support it.
The reason that price reductions could be so dramatic and yet
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not indicate active competition is that costs themselves have fallen
substantially. Domestic US long distance rates have been affected by
regulatory actions that have led to considerable reductions in the per-
minute access charges that are paid by US long distance carriers to
local carriers for the origination and termination of a call. Access
charges have fallen from 17.26 cents per minute in 1984 to 2.85 cents
per minute in 2000 (Industry Analysis Division (2000), p. 1-4, nominal
values). For international long distance, the accounting rates that
govern the cost of sending a call overseas from the US have also fallen
considerably. Clearly, in the face of dramatic cost reductions, prices
would likely decline even in the absence of competition. Thus the
effect of competition on prices is not obvious despite the fact that
prices have generally fallen.
The work analyzing the relationship between long distance com-
petition and prices deals primarily with domestic US pricing (see
Edelman (1997), MacAvoy (1995, 1996 and 1998), Taylor and Taylor
(1993) and Taylor and Zona (1997).) One prominent strand of work,
exemplified by MacAvoy (1995 and 1998) examines “basic rate” price
changes between 1985 or 1987 and the early 1990s to show that prices
have decreased less quickly than costs, thus indicating that margins
have increased over time, while costs have fallen. This work, while
certainly of value, faces two primary limitations. First of all, its mea-
sure of price typically focuses on the highest price plan (or “basic”
plan.1) Major long distance companies have customers on a variety of
different plans, and a minority of calls are actually covered by a basic
rate plan. It thus ignores the majority of usage that might be indica-
tive of actual price competition. Second, the work consists primarily
1This is the default rate received by a consumer who signs up for no special long
distance plan.
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of a graphical analysis of trends, and thus its statistical strength is
somewhat limited.
Previous work focusing on international pricing is relatively limited
(see Acton and Vogelsang (1992), Bewley and Fiebig (1988), Cave and
Donnelly (1996), and Madden and Savage (2000)) and has not focused
on the impact of competition, except for Madden and Savage. They
analyze a limited number of countries and focus primarily on the thesis
that prices fall as markets become more symmetric in their levels of
competition and private ownership.2 Madden and Savage examine
only one price for each market and thus do not analyze the plan-
specific pricing of carriers. The current research is distinct in that the
interpretation of competitiveness variables will be clearer and, more
importantly for the current project, price dispersion of different plans
will be analyzed.
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of long distance competition
on prices in the US by focusing on international calls originating in the
US. One of the two primary questions of this paper is whether prices
decrease the most when concentration decreases the most. If so, then
we cannot reject the hypothesis that increased competition on routes is
associated with lower prices on those routes. In particular, we examine
how price changes varied depending on the change in concentration on
country-pair routes between 1994 and 1998. This analysis allows for a
statistical power that is absent from studies relying solely on changes
in domestic interstate rates. There are more than 100 countries with
annual data on prices, costs and other variables. Moreover, over the
relevant time period the number of competitors on many routes has
increased considerably, but to different degrees in different countries
2The interpretation of their competitiveness variables is somewhat unclear since they
are all multiplied by the number of minutes of traffic even though the dependent variable
of price is apparently not quantity-adjusted.
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at different times.
Perhaps one of the most interesting features of the pricing of long
distance calls in general, and of international long distance in partic-
ular, is that there is a wide dispersion in available prices between the
low-priced flagship plans and higher-priced basic plans. Many US cus-
tomers do not enroll in their primary interexchange carrier’s cheapest
plan for their calling patterns despite the fact that the basic plan calls
can easily cost as much as ten times more than flagship plan calls. This
dramatic price dispersion gives rise to the second primary question of
this paper: Does price dispersion increase or decrease as competi-
tion increases? Intuitively, one might imagine that price dispersion
is most likely to survive under monopolistic industry structure, but
less likely to survive as the structure grows more competitive, since
a competitor will likely have the incentive to offer a plan type that
is, in some sense, intermediate between those of its competitors when
its competitors attempt to segment the market into two or more cus-
tomer types. An increasing body of literature suggests that markets
subject to competition can contain significant price dispersion for rea-
sons unrelated to cost differences (see, for example, Borenstein (1985),
Shepard (1991), Borenstein (1991), Borenstein and Rose (1994), and
Sorenson (2000).) These papers analyze products that are relatively,
but not perfectly, homogeneous and that contain multiple sellers, such
as gasoline and air travel. A common theory underlying the work is
that consumer search costs explain the price dispersion. As the ex-
pected gains from search grow, price dispersion will fall. In line with
this theory, Sorenson (2000) finds that repeatedly purchased pharma-
ceutical prescriptions, for which one would expect the greatest benefit
from search, have significantly lower price dispersion than other types
of prescriptions. Most surprisingly, Borenstein and Rose (1994) note
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that there is a significant positive effect of competition on price dis-
persion. That is, on a more competitive airline route, prices on the
route tend to exhibit more dispersion. This result is particularly in-
teresting because it suggests that price dispersion may not only exist
in competitive markets but rather may on occasion be greater in com-
petitive markets than in more monopolistic ones. The result is based
on a cross-sectional analysis of airline fares in the second quarter of
1992.
The current data is well constructed for examining the question
of whether, over time, price dispersion increases as competition in-
creases in international long distance. In contrast to previous work,
this analysis takes advantage of a panel formulation of the relationship
between price dispersion and concentration, thus avoiding certain en-
dogeneity problems that may perturb a pure cross-sectional approach.
In addition, the telecommunications market benefits from having a rel-
atively simple measure of dispersion, namely the difference between
flagship and basic rates, since there are two main international long
distance prices offered to residential customers by a typical long dis-
tance carrier. As a result, this analysis can provide a relatively crisp
characterization of the relationship between dispersion and competi-
tion.
Variable costs can be measured with a relatively high degree of
precision and thus their effect on price can be reasonably disentan-
gled from the effect of concentration. Between 1994 and 1998, the
long distance companies’ costs of making international long distance
calls have fallen dramatically in measurable ways. The cost to a long
distance company of completing a call to a foreign country is made
up of three primary parts: a local access charge paid to the local US
telephone company, the network cost of bringing the call to another
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country, and a per-minute settlement rate that is paid to the foreign
carrier that completes the call. The settlement rate has typically been
negotiated by AT&T and foreign carriers under a regulatory frame-
work that governs the allocation of return calls between carriers and
the rate paid and received by a provider for sending and receiving
calls. The rate negotiated by AT&T is then applied to all US carriers.
From the perspective of a carrier besides AT&T, these rate changes
can be viewed as exogenous cost shocks. Generally, the settlement
charges constitute the vast majority of the cost of completing a call
overseas.
The settlement mechanism includes a rule that when traffic is sent
to the US from a foreign carrier, the foreign carrier pays a per minute
settlement rate to the US carrier that is equivalent to the rate the
US carrier pays for sending a call to the foreign carrier. In addition,
the foreign carrier must return traffic to US carriers in proportion
to the number of minutes sent to that carrier’s country by the US
carrier. For example, if Sprint sends 24% of the traffic from the US
to a foreign country, that foreign country’s carrier must return 24%
of its US-bound traffic through Sprint. While a long distance carrier
incurs charges for completing a call to a foreign country, it generates
counterbalancing revenue when it receives traffic from that foreign
carrier. Thus, from the US long distance carrier’s perspective, the net
cost of making calls overseas includes the settlement rates from both
outgoing and incoming calls. Since the number of outgoing minutes
from the US generally exceeds the number of incoming minutes, the
US carriers generally face a positive per-minute cost per call.3
3This unusual mechanism of cost imposition was created to counterbalance the possi-
bility that foreign carriers would charge high rates for traffic to their countries, and then
negotiate low rates for return traffic with just one of the competing US carriers, lead-
ing to a higher telecom trade imbalance than already exists between the US and foreign
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In the late 1990s, the rules governing the international settlement
process have changed to reflect the fact that in some countries there
are now competing long distance carriers. In fact, rates to some coun-
tries (e.g., Canada) can be lower than many domestic long-distance
rates in the US. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
has recently set target settlement rates for different countries which,
when achieved, allow non-dominant carriers in those countries to opt
out of the international settlement process. In addition, the FCC in-
troduced in 1994 International Simple Resale (ISR) for countries that
met certain competitiveness criteria within the country and which had
settlement rates below particular target rates. ISR service is the provi-
sion of international switched traffic services over international private
lines. ISR service allows the US-originating carrier and end-country
receiving carrier to avoid the traditional settlements system.
There were significant changes in the international environment
over the time period of analysis, in particular with the formation of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and with the full or
partial implementation of the WTO telecommunications agreement
in selected WTO countries in 1998. Clearly it is of policy interest to
see whether there have been price impacts of either WTO member-
ship or agreements, so variables reflecting these changes will also be
considered.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses
the competitive model and the method of estimating costs. Section 3
discusses the data that is used in this paper and presents descriptive
statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 then
concludes.
countries (the trade imbalance for IMTS calls was about $4.8 billion in 1998 (Industry
Analysis Division, 2000.) For a further discussion of the International Settlement Process,
its distortions, and a proposal for a less distorted process, see Malueg and Schwartz (1998).
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2 Model
The first question considered here is whether increasing competition
on a route is associated with reductions in prices on that route. The
second question considered is whether price dispersion increases or de-
creases as competition increases. These questions implicitly assume
that pricing for different country pairs is largely governed by country-
specific conditions. Given that international pricing plans typically
involve prices for all countries, it is not obvious that separating prices
on a route-by-route basis is appropriate. If we find that concentration
levels on a route are related to prices on that route, then the fact that
prices for international calling are typically bundled together does not
imply that international calls are in fact a bundled product. Particu-
larly given that much international calling is generated by foreign-born
residents calling their relatives and friends in the nation of their birth,
we might expect that demand for an international plan, with its bun-
dle of prices, is frequently governed by considerations of solely one of
those prices.
This work mitigates the standard endogeneity criticism of cross-
sectional price-concentration studies by reporting results from the
analysis of a panel data set with fixed effects. Moreover, since this
study focuses on the actions of common firms in one industry fac-
ing common, route-specific cost shocks, the panel data set approach
holds considerable promise. Costs are known with great precision be-
cause the vast majority of international long distance costs arise from
observable, regulated settlement rates.
Before examining the relationship between prices and concentra-
tion, we should also consider how prices will change when costs are
also changing. That is, we might expect that, assuming constant
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costs, if competition increases (or concentration decreases), industry-
wide prices will fall. For simplicity, we assume that this period is
exemplified primarily by changes in supply conditions, as the average
cost of calls fell by about 50%. This assumption is most reasonable
when the time period of analysis is short, the number of foreign-born
residents is little changed, and the amount of US trade with a foreign
country is litte changed.4
Our model relates prices over time to concentration levels over
time, as well as to cost and regulatory variables. We will estimate this
model in a panel framework with fixed effects for countries. That is,
pit = Di + hit + cit +WTOit + ISRit + eit
where
pit: price in country i in period t
Di: dummy set to 1 for country i
hit: concentration in country i in period t
cit: cost in country i in period t
WTO it: WTO dummy variables in country i in period t
ISRit: ISR status dummy variable in country i in period t
The costs include the payment made by the U.S. carrier to overseas
carriers for completing calls, the payments made to U.S. local carriers
for originating or completing calls, and the actual physical cost to the
carrier of carrying the call.
The model will be estimated for overall average prices by all US
carriers, for provider-specific average prices, and for provider-specific
plan prices.
4In order to maintain our assumption that changes found in this data are primarily
related to supply conditions, countries where we might expect that demand conditions
have changed considerably over the time period of analysis are excluded from the data set.
These include Vietnam and Eastern European countries. Their exclusion, however, does
not affect the results.
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In order to investigate the relationship between price dispersion
and competition, we will estimate a second model that relates the
degree of price dispersion to factors including the change in concen-
tration. The model is:
pdit = Di + hit + cit +WTOit + ISRit + eit
where
pd it: difference between basic rate in country i in period t for a
given carrier and flagship rate in country i in period t.
We will estimate this second model in a panel framework with fixed
effects for countries focusing on the price differences between basic and
flagship rates, on a route by route basis. We will estimate the model
for Sprint and MCI. AT&T is excluded because the framework of its
flagship plan changed significantly over the period of analysis.
3 Data
In order to estimate the equations above, we use measures of price,
cost, concentration, the WTO status of countries, and the FCC-
determined ISR status of countries. We measure price as either an
average price or a plan-specific price. Average price to a country is
calculated by taking the domestic revenue from all international call-
ing to a country and dividing by the number of minutes of calling to
that country. Plan-specific prices detail the flagship rates of a car-
rier to a specific country or the basic rates charged by a carrier when
consumers call a specific country. We rely on data collected by the
US federal telecommunications regulator from 1994 through 1998 to
estimate average prices, costs, and concentration on a route by route
basis.
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The average price measures are calculated first for all carriers pro-
viding international telephone service and then for the three primary
individual carriers over this time period, MCI, Sprint, and AT&T. In-
ternational flagship rates are calculated based on the lowest marginal
rate available for calls to a foreign country.5 These data are submitted
to the FCC in regular tariff filings by each carrier. The flagship rate
is a per-minute rate. Basic rates are calculated as the rate charged
to a customer for calls made to foreign countries when not signed up
for any special foreign rate plans. Basic rates are typically 2-3 times
higher than flagship rates to a country. All price measures are ad-
justed for inflation with the CPI-U index from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000.) They are then logged.
The primary data source for cost and concentration consists of the
FCC international data gathered according to section 43.61 of FCC
regulations (FCC 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000). Between
1994 and 1998, all carriers had to report figures related to traffic car-
ried over their international facilities, including revenues, payments,
and outgoing and incoming minutes on a route by route basis.
In order to calculate the costs of sending traffic to a given country,
we begin with the net revenue paid by U.S. carriers to overseas car-
riers from that country and from the revenues of their return traffic
from that country. From this, the cost of originating, terminating,
and carrying calls to the international meeting point is subtracted to
5Over this time period, MCI’s flagship plan involved a $3.00 monthly charge and then
a marginal rate per minute of usage, as did Sprint’s flagship plan. The beginning of the
time period is selected because 1994 is the first year for which the price data was easily
available. The marginal rate is used here as the price indicator. For years when there was
time-of-day pricing, the cheapest time period was selected. Adjustments to these prices
for the monthly fee would be arbitrary and, to the extent that customers are selecting
between plans with the same monthly fee, irrelevant, because their choice between long
distance calling plans would then be influenced by the marginal rates.
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calculate the prices for Message Telephone Service (MTS) traffic to
specific countries.
The settlement costs between a carrier and the carriers of a for-
eign country are determined by a formula that returns traffic to the
US-based carrier in proportion to the number of minutes that it sends
of the total minutes sent from the US. Thus revenues derived from
incoming minutes counterbalance the costs of sending outgoing min-
utes. Represent the total cost to carrier i of transmitting Oi outgoing
minutes to a country as Ci. Then
Ci = s
(
Oi −
Oi
O
I
)
where
Oi = the number of outgoing minutes of carrier i
O = the total number of outgoing minutes from the US
I = the total number of incoming minutes to the US
s = the settlement rate
The cost for originating and terminating access is derived from the
FCC’s table of originating and terminating charges, multiplied by the
number of outgoing minutes (for the originating charge) and incoming
minutes for the terminating charge. In addition, transport costs are
estimated as 1 cent per minute, falling to 0.5 cents per minute by
1998. These estimates are intended to capture a known trend whose
impact on route costs varied by route according to the relative traffic
ratio between the US and the country at the other end of the route.
This transport cost decline assumption does not affect the results. All
financial variables are adjusted for inflation with the CPI-U and then
logged.6
6There are inaccuracies in some of the data, suggesting, for instance, that rates to
particular countries or territories may fluctuate by a factor of 20 from one year to the next
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Concentration measures are calculated using the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (HHI) and are based on minutes of traffic, as op-
posed to firm revenues and thus limit the direct impact of price on
HHI. This means the HHI is not calculated from revenue information.
The HHI provides a good measure of facilities-based concentration but
provides an imperfect view of firm shares in the end-consumer market-
place because the FCC reports are solely for facilities-based providers.
Thus these reports exclude resellers who might sell minutes to end-
consumers. Thus, the HHI statistics provide a better measure of ca-
pacity concentration than retail concentration. In measuring potential
competition between different facilities-based providers, focusing on
capacity concentration may be preferable. Importantly, HHI values
have exhibited substantial variation between 1994 and 1998. These
values are shown in Table 1.
In order to reduce endogeneity in the relationship between price
and concentration (which need not be severe in cases where the price
considered in the regression is from a plan selected only by a small
portion of all customers, and thus possibly not influencing the HHI
very much at all, given that it is likely determined by the distribution
of prices available), an instrumental variable for HHI is calculated as a
function of the prior period’s HHI for a given route and of the average
current-period HHI for other countries.
In addition, we include data on the competitiveness of the desti-
nation country’s telecommunications market (as indicated by if and
and then back by a roughly inverse factor in the following year. Such a pattern certainly
suggests misreporting. These inaccuracies occur almost exclusively with respect to the
countries accounting for the smallest amounts of traffic. Such inaccuracies are inherently
likely in cases when there are multiple reporters who generate reports specifically for a
regulatory purpose and not for an ongoing business purpose. Consequently, results will
be reported for only the 100 largest revenue countries. Limiting the number of countries
considered does not alter the nature or significance of the results.
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when the FCC grants ISR status), on the impact of international
WTO membership of the destination country, and on the impact of
implementing the main WTO telecom provisions.7 Negotiations for
the telecommunications agreement were completed in 1997 and im-
plemented in 1998 by a relatively small set of WTO members. The
ISR, WTO, and WTO telecom agreement information is represented
by dummy variables that are 1 in the period of change and thereafter.
For instance, if a country were among the original WTO signatories,
WTO membership would be indicated by a dummy set to 1 in 1995,
when the WTO agreement went into effect.
Summary statistics are provided in Table 2.
4 Results
The results for these fixed effect regressions are reported in Tables
3-12. When considering average prices across carriers or for specific
carriers, concentration has a positive and significant relationship to
price, suggesting that reductions in concentration are associated with
reductions in price. These results are consistent with the view that
telecommunications competition leads to lower prices for consumers,
even after adjusting for changes in the costs of making telephone calls.
Surprisingly, carriers appear to adjust their prices differently when
setting their flagship rates and their basic rates. Lower flagship rates
are associated with lower levels of concentration. However, basic rates
are inversely related to levels of concentration. That is, as competition
on a route increases, basic rates on that route typically increase.
7Traffic that is carried under the ISR system is still reportable under section 43.61
of FCC regulations. Thus the data relied on for much of this analysis should reflect a
complete record of reported minutes and accounting payments to foreign countries over
the time period in question.
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These results are confirmed further by the regressions reported in
Tables 11 and 12, which examine the extent of price dispersion be-
tween flagship and basic plans for MCI and for Sprint. These findings
suggest that price dispersion increases as competition on a route in-
creases. The relationship between concentration and price dispersion
is statistically significant both for MCI and for Sprint. This result
is somewhat surprising, given that one might intuitively expect that
price dispersion would be largest under the most monopolistic route
structures.
The finding is consistent with a carrier setting lower rates on its
plan designed for the most price-elastic consumers as competition in-
creases on a route, but at the same time raising the rates for the most
inelastic consumers. The relationship between price and concentra-
tion could arise because increased competition at the low rate side of
the spectrum, due to pre-paid cards, leads to lower flagship rates. As
flagship rates fall, the expected benefits of search increase, leading the
more price-sensitive basic rate consumers to leave for better plans. As
the remaining group of basic rate consumers is more inelastic than
before, it is most profitable to actually raise prices to that group at a
time when concentration is generally decreasing. This suggests that at
least one significant and relatively discrete set of consumers may suffer
from increased levels of competition in international long distance.
Given the inverse movement of prices on the basic rate and flagship
plans, it is important to consider whether, overall, increased compe-
tition hurts or helps consumers. Data limitations prevent us from
knowing the quantity of minutes provided under the basic rates and
under flagship plan rates. Thus, the simplest approach to answering
the question of the overall impact of competition on consumers may
be to examine the impact of changes in concentration on the average
16
prices charged by a carrier. The fact that the lower average prices
from providers are associated with lower concentration levels suggests
that, on net, the negative impact on the basic rate consumers is out-
weighed by the beneficial impact on other consumers from decreased
levels of concentration.
Costs, interestingly, also enter the basic rate regressions with a
negative sign but a small coefficient (generally not significantly differ-
ent from 0.) This may seem odd, but it is actually the case that, in
a period of declining costs, the average basic rates rose substantially,
from $0.97 per minute to $1.41 between 1994 and 1998 (see table 2,
both for MCI and Sprint, nominal values.)
Apart from cost and US-based concentration relationships, it is
important to consider the impacts of regulatory variables. The in-
terpretation of results relating to the regulatory variables must be
cautious due to the difficulty of interpreting the meaning of various
regulatory and membership decisions. ISR designations are some-
times, though not systematically, associated with significantly lower
prices. This may arise from the fact that ISR designations indicate a
higher degree of competition in destination countries.
WTO membership appears to be associated with lower prices for
international traffic over and above any effects that may arise from
reduced accounting rates as a result of WTO membership, since ac-
counting rates are included within the cost measure. This may reflect
a general pro-competition bias on the part of governments that are
WTO members relative to those that are not.
Countries’ commitments to open their markets in accord with
WTO telecom agreement principles do appear significantly related to
lower prices in flagship plan rates, but not for overall average prices
or for basic rates.
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5 Conclusion
The results strongly suggest that, even for the international flagship
plans offered by the major carriers, international pricing varies on a
country by country basis in a way that reflects the costs of sending
traffic to a given country and the level of competition to that country.
This finding is interesting because generally, when consumers purchase
international flagship plans, they sign up for a bundle of rates to all
foreign countries. Thus one might consider that international traffic
should be analyzed as a bundled product. However, the pricing re-
lationships found here suggest that it is appropriate to consider each
international route individually when evaluating competition. This is
presumably because, while consumers face bundled prices, most peo-
ple who make frequent international calls direct them primarily to one
country, and thus care primarily about just one of the prices in the
bundle when selecting their bundle.
Increased competition is associated with lower average prices for
international long distance and with lower prices in flagship plans.
Curiously, though, increased competition is associated with higher
prices in basic plans.
Pricing displays high and increasing price dispersion. As concen-
tration decreases, the difference increases between flagship plan prices
and basic plan prices.8 The fact that prices can move in opposite
directions in plans offered by the same carrier suggests the complex
nature of the demand for telecommunications services. More generally,
however, this increased dispersion represents an interesting example
of how offering a better deal for one plan, in response to competition,
8This result helps to explain MacAvoy’s finding of basic rate increases during periods
of cost and concentration reductions, while at the same time suggesting that, on average,
lower levels of concentration are indeed associated with lower rates.
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may shift the distribution of customers between the offered plans, so
that raising prices for the other plan becomes profitable, as the con-
sumers remaining in the other plan are, on average, less price-sensitive
than before.
International long distance data holds great potential for mea-
suring the relationship between telecommunications competition and
prices. The reason is that international data allows for a panel data
set analysis that involves far more variation than any purely domestic
analysis could provide. The findings here suggest that telecommu-
nications competition is highly beneficial to consumers. An increase
from 3 equal-sized firms to 4, for instance, may be associated with a
price decrease on the order of 11.7% when considering the most im-
portant markets for telecommunications providers. While these find-
ings relate strictly to international telephone calling, they actually re-
flect competition between domestic US carriers to carry domestically-
originated international calls and thus can be viewed broadly as find-
ings about domestic US competition. Overall, these results suggest
that pro-competitive policies may have beneficial impacts, whether
implemented by domestic policy makers or by international organiza-
tions such as the WTO.
Further theoretical research is needed to better understand the pro-
cess by which increasing competition might be associated with greater
price dispersion. Such a theory might focus on a changing distribu-
tion of consumers between plans when there is intense competition to
provide one type of plan and limited competition to provide another.
Further empirical work might focus on the increasingly significant long
distance competition in countries besides the US that have opened up
their markets to long distance competition. These extensions are be-
yond the scope of the current work, however, which is focused purely
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on improving our understanding of US-originated long distance call-
ing.
The findings of this paper are consistent with the idea that in-
creasing competition yields beneficial results for the average consumer.
These findings do not necessarily mean, however, that all consumers
benefit from competition. Indeed, in this instance, competition may
be associated with diverging effects, depending on the degree of the
consumer’s price-sensitivity, as indicated by the plan chosen by the
consumers. The price-sensitive consumers appear to benefit the most
from competition, and this benefit appears to outweigh the harm to
the less price-sensitive consumers.
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Table 1: Concentration measures for International Long Distance Minutes to
the Top 30 Countries
Country 1994 HHI 1998 HHI Change
Mexico 4,769 3,594 -1,175
Canada 4,013 4,028 15
United Kingdom 4,246 2,345 -1,901
Germany 4,938 2,932 -2,006
Japan 3,832 2,565 -1,267
Philippines 4,478 2,644 -1,834
Korea, South 4,058 3,192 -866
India 4,155 3,251 -904
France 3,868 2,821 -1,047
Dominican Republic 3,057 1,839 -1,218
China 3,746 2,243 -1,502
Italy 5,053 3,581 -1,472
Taiwan 3,706 2,835 -871
Colombia 4,721 3,638 -1,084
Hong Kong 3,537 2,836 -701
Israel 3,694 3,220 -474
Brazil 4,426 3,515 -911
Jamaica 5,918 3,943 -1,975
El Salvador 5,397 2,300 -3,097
Pakistan 5,193 3,374 -1,819
Spain 4,373 3,272 -1,100
Guatemala 4,943 2,744 -2,199
Ecuador 4,545 4,226 -319
Switzerland 4,342 2,802 -1,539
Netherlands 3,859 2,336 -1,523
Argentina 3,985 2,868 -1,118
Peru 5,084 3,742 -1,342
Thailand 4,112 3,492 -620
Saudi Arabia 4,397 3,727 -670
Venezuela 4,508 3,581 -926
Source: Calculations from FCC 43.61 Data
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for 1994 and 1998
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
hhi94 100 0.473 0.080 0.306 0.841
hhi98 100 0.333 0.082 0.176 0.716
isr94 100 0.020 0.141 0.000 1.000
isr98 100 0.160 0.368 0.000 1.000
wto94 100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
wto98 100 0.820 0.386 0.000 1.000
wtotel94 100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
wtotel98 100 0.200 0.402 0.000 1.000
pri94 100 0.806 0.235 0.240 2.078
pri98 100 0.477 0.152 0.189 1.198
costpm94 100 0.383 0.203 0.081 1.308
costpm98 100 0.223 0.118 0.032 0.507
MCI average price 94 100 0.700 0.216 0.243 1.690
MCI average price 98 100 0.472 0.209 0.162 1.234
MCI flagship price 94 82 0.509 0.160 0.115 1.119
MCI flagship price 98 83 0.387 0.195 0.074 0.969
MCI basic price 94 82 0.972 0.261 0.317 2.167
MCI basic price 98 83 1.416 1.242 0.331 11.831
MCI cost per minute 94 100 0.401 0.225 0.084 1.458
MCI cost per minute 98 100 0.217 0.129 0.007 0.696
Sprint average price 94 100 0.757 0.245 0.230 1.890
Sprint average price 98 100 0.467 0.241 0.124 1.839
Sprint flagship price 94 82 0.590 0.201 0.128 1.283
Sprint flagship price 98 83 0.389 0.186 0.061 0.938
Sprint basic price 94 82 0.972 0.261 0.317 2.167
Sprint basic price 98 83 1.416 1.242 0.331 11.831
Sprint cost per minute 94 100 0.393 0.195 0.030 1.027
Sprint cost per minute 98 100 0.221 0.174 -0.268 1.244
ATT price 94 100 0.870 0.244 0.255 2.203
ATT price 98 100 0.617 0.222 0.193 1.727
ATT cost per minute 94 100 0.373 0.207 0.076 1.359
ATT cost per minute 98 100 0.250 0.149 0.041 0.906
Dollar figures are nominal and not logged.
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Table 3: All International Long Distance Average Price: 1994-1998
Dependent variable: average price of all long distance carriers
hhi 1.821*
(8.262)
costpm 0.277*
(5.922)
isr -0.121
(-1.594)
wto -0.030
(-1.077)
wtotel -0.098
(-1.501)
n 500
groups 100
R2 within 0.4722
Average price to a country is calculated by taking the domestic revenue from all
international calling to a country and dividing by the number of minutes of calling
to that country.
Regression with fixed country effects. t-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 0.01 level
**Significant at 0.05 level
***Significant at 0.10 level
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Table 4: MCI International Long Distance Average Price: 1994-1998
Dependent variable: MCI average price across all plans
hhi 1.970* 1.989*
(7.754) (7.895)
costpm 0.041 -
(0.768)
mcostpm - 0.023
(0.638)
isr -0.321* -0.329*
(-3.659) (-3.811)
wto -0.014 -0.016
(-0.433) (-0.529)
wtotel -0.074 -0.077
(-0.985) (-1.036)
n 500 500
groups 100 100
R2 within 0.314 0.313
Average price to a country is calculated by taking the MCI domestic revenue
from all international calling to a country and dividing by the number of MCI
minutes of calling to that country.
Regression with fixed country effects. t-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 0.01 level
**Significant at 0.05 level
***Significant at 0.10 level
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Table 5: MCI International Long Distance Flagship Plans: 1994-1998
Dependent variable: MCI flagship plan rates
hhi 1.137* 1.700*
(5.151) (7.407)
costpm 0.381* -
(8.406)
mcostpm - 0.110*
(3.612)
isr -0.114*** -0.204*
(-1.650) (-2.776)
wto 0.079* 0.049***
(3.029) (1.769)
wtotel -0.226* -0.285*
(-3.853) (-4.524)
n 414 414
groups 83 83
R2 within 0.5358 0.457
Regression with fixed country effects. t-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 0.01 level
**Significant at 0.05 level
***Significant at 0.10 level
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Table 6: MCI International Long Distance Basic Rates: 1994-1998
Dependent variable: MCI basic rates
hhi -0.748* -0.756*
(-4.004) (-4.211)
costpm -0.048 -
(-1.244)
mcostpm - -0.034*
(-1.404)
isr -0.054 -0.049
(-0.933) (-0.852)
wto 0.107* 0.110*
(4.852) (5.051)
wtotel 0.015 0.020
(0.298) (0.399)
n 414 414
groups 83 83
R2 within 0.2482 0.2491
Regression with fixed country effects. t-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 0.01 level
**Significant at 0.05 level
***Significant at 0.10 level
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Table 7: Sprint International Long Distance Average Price: 1994-1998
Dependent variable: Sprint average price across all plans
hhi 1.714* 2.181*
(6.602) (8.528)
costpm 0.309* -
(5.616)
scostpm - 0.096*
(2.622)
isr -0.108 -0.182**
(-1.201) (-2.00)
wto -0.144* -0.161*
(-4.459) (-4.815)
wtotel -0.020 -0.057
(-0.256) (-0.727)
n 499 495
groups 100 100
R2 within 0.446 0.413
Average price to a country is calculated by taking the Sprint domestic revenue
from all international calling to a country and dividing by the number of Sprint
minutes of calling to that country.
Regression with fixed country effects. t-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 0.01 level
**Significant at 0.05 level
***Significant at 0.10 level
30
Table 8: Sprint International Long Distance Flagship Plans: 1994-1998
Dependent variable: Sprint flagship plan rates
hhi 1.102* 1.418*
(5.389) (7.093)
costpm 0.314* -
(7.479)
scostpm - 0.149*
(4.998)
isr -0.002 -0.078
(-0.037) (-1.203)
wto -0.081* -0.099*
(-3.368) (-3.990)
wtotel -0.224* -0.241*
(-4.107) (-4.286)
n 414 411
groups 83 83
R2 within 0.5695 0.5353
Regression with fixed country effects. t-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 0.01 level
**Significant at 0.05 level
***Significant at 0.10 level
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Table 9: Sprint International Long Distance Basic Rates: 1994-1998
Dependent variable: Sprint basic rates
hhi -0.748* -0.817*
(-4.004) (-4.580)
costpm -0.048 -
(-1.244)
scostpm - -0.013
(-0.475)
isr -0.054 -0.041
(-0.933) (-0.719)
wto 0.107* 0.112*
(4.852) (5.065)
wtotel 0.015* 0.021
(0.298) (0.411)
n 414 411
groups 83 83
R2 within 0.2482 0.2456
Regression with fixed country effects. t-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 0.01 level
**Significant at 0.05 level
***Significant at 0.10 level
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Table 10: AT&T International Long Distance: 1994-1998
Dependent variable: AT&T average price across all plans
hhi 1.069* 1.591*
(3.694) (5.897)
costpm 0.164* -
(2.678)
acostpm - -0.109**
(1.819)
isr -0.143 -0.237*
(-1.435) (-2.365)
wto -0.018 -0.043
(-0.510) (-1.185)
wtotel -0.073 -0.117
(-0.860) (-1.381)
n 499 499
groups 100 100
R2 within 0.171 0.163
Average price to a country is calculated by taking the domestic AT&T revenue
from all international calling to a country and dividing by the number of AT&T
minutes of calling to that country.
Regression with fixed country effects. t-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 0.01 level
**Significant at 0.05 level
***Significant at 0.10 level
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Table 11: MCI International Long Distance: Basic-Flagship Price Dispersion
1994-1998
Dependent variable: MCI price dispersion
hhi -1.885* -2.456*
(-6.843) (-8.742)
costpm -0.429* -
(7.578)
mcostpm - -0.143*
(-3.848)
isr 0.059 0.155*
(0.689) (1.723)
wto 0.028 0.061
(0.864) (1.783)
wtotel 0.241* 0.305*
(3.289) (3.951)
n 414 414
groups 83 83
R2 within 0.570 0.517
Price dispersion for a given year is calculated by taking the basic rate charged
by MCI for international calling to a country and subtracting MCI’s flagship plan
rate to that country.
Regression with fixed country effects. t-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 0.01 level
**Significant at 0.05 level
***Significant at 0.10 level
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Table 12: Sprint International Long Distance: Basic-Flagship Price Disper-
sion 1994-1998
Dependent variable: Sprint price dispersion
hhi -1.850* -2.235*
(-6.485) (-8.021)
costpm -0.362* -
(-6.175)
scostpm - -0.161*
(-3.890)
isr -0.052 -0.036
(-0.584) (-0.403)
wto 0.187* 0.210*
(5.592) (6.106)
wtotel 0.238* 0.261*
(3.139) (3.337)
n 414 414
groups 83 83
R2 within 0.575 0.548
Price dispersion for a given year is calculated by taking the basic rate charged
by Sprint for international calling to a country and subtracting Sprint’s flagship
plan rate to that country.
Regression with fixed country effects. t-statistics in parentheses.
*Significant at 0.01 level
**Significant at 0.05 level
***Significant at 0.10 level
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